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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

As originally set forth in Appellant's Brief, this is a
Workman's Compensation case involving the claim of a dependent
spouse for death benefits.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

No additional facts are necessary for a determination of the
issues in this matter.
of Facts.

Appellant relies on her original Statement

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The "dependency standard" in Utah is far broader than the
dependency standards set forth in the cases from foreign jurisdictions relied upon by Respondents.

Appellant was a dependent

spouse at the time of her husband's death.

ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE CASES RELIED UPON BY RESPONDENTS ARE EITHER
DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE PRESENT CASE OR
SUPPORTIVE OF APPELLANT'S POSITION

With the exception of Hancock, et al v. Industrial
Commission of Utah, 198 P.169 (1921), the cases cited by
Respondents are either irrelevant or distinguishable, and
Appellant should be awarded her statutory death benefits of
$30,000.00.
The Hancock, supra., case cited by Respondent Default
Indemnity Fund, establishes and explains the Utah test of dependency.

Although the facts in that case do not fit the present

situation, the law does.

That test of dependency was based upon

the Delaware case of In Benjamin F. Shaw Co. v. Palmatory, 7
Boyce (Del.) 105 ATL, at page 418, quoting:
f

It is not sufficient that the contributions
of the employe were used in paying the living
expenses of the claimant, but it must be
2

shown that the contributions of the employe
were relied upon by the dependent for his or
her means of living judging this by the class
and position of life of the dependent.f
* * *

'However, test of dependency, generally
speaking, is whether the claimant relied upon
the employe's contributions for his supporting wholly or partially judging this by what
would be reasonable living expenses for
persons in the same class and position.
Support as used within the meaning of the
statute is of a broader import than food,
clothing and shelter, and may include all
such means of living as would enable the
claimant to live in a style and condition and
with a degree of comfort suitable and becoming
to his station in life.' Id.
This same philosophy was again approved in the Utah case of
Farnsworth v. Industrial Commission, 534 P.2d 897 (Utah 1975):
. . . dependency within the terms of the
statute does not mean absolute dependency for
the necessities of life, but rather that the
applicant looked to and relied on the contributions of the workman in whole or in part
as a means of supporting and maintaining
himself in accordance with his social position and accustomed mode of life. Id., at
899.
The foreign cases relied upon by Respondents adhere to a
more narrow interpretation of the word "support" and are not as
broad as the Utah standard.

For example, in Penn Sanitation Co.

v. Hoskins, 10 P.Cmwlth. 528, 312 A.2d 458 (1973), cited by
Respondents Revlon Service, Inc. and Liberty Mutual, the Court
concluded it was bound by a support order entered five weeks
earlier, which provided only for the couple's two children.
Because the support order was acquiesced in by the wife, she was

3

not entitled to claim she had been supported by her deceased
husband for purposes of dependency under the Workman's
Compensation statute.
Likewise, S & S Associates, Inc. v. WCAB (Hochman), 465 A.2d
57 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1983) , cited by the same Respondents, is too
narrow an interpretation.
the facts.

The case is also distinguishable on

Although the Claimant in that case was also relying

on the fact that her deceased husband was paying the mortgage
payments, the parties had been separated for almost three years
and had established separate lives for themselves.

The decedent,

Mr. Hochman, was living in the parties' house with another woman,
and Mrs. Hochman was living in an apartment in Boston with her
daughter whom she was supporting, and she sought no support order
for her husband during this period.
their own expenses.

They both worked and paid

In light of these facts, the court felt that

mortgage payments were not support and reversed the Workman's
Compensation Appeal Board.
The Colorado case of City of Aurora v. Claimant in Death of
Corr, 689 P.2d 659 (Colo.App. 1984), cited by Respondents Revlon
Service, Inc. and Liberty Mutual, involved a factual situation
where each party had been paying his or her own living expenses
while each was earning equal salaries.

The facts in Aurora,

supra., do not indicate the amount or nature of the joint obligations which were incurred in the marriage, nor the ability of
the claimant to pay those obligations.

The Colorado court,

stating there were not enough facts to support the Commission's
4

decision to grant the claimant relief, reversed the Commission
and affirmed the hearing officer's order, which initially denied
the petition.

These foreign cases may illustrate one point - that

the question of support or dependency, as it relates to the
payment of debts of the parties, is a factual question and not a
question of law.
In the instant case, the Dahls1 lives had not become as
separate and distinct as the three-year separation in Hochman,
supra, and the parties had substantial liabilities.

The payments

by Mr. Dahl toward their joint debts and mortgage was a primary
concern of Mrs. Dahl.

In fact, she gave up her claim to

temporary support of $750.00 in exchange for Mr. Dahl agreeing to
assume the mortgage and other financial obligations of the
parties.

Prior to that understanding, she even contributed

$200.00 per month for a period of three months to assist her
husband in the payment of these debts.

It is undisputed that

Mrs. Dahl was unable on her salary to make the $800.00 per month
mortgage payments and that she was $5,000.00 in arrears in the
payments when this matter was presented to the Industrial
Commission.
The 1984 joint tax return indicates the total earnings of
the parties of $59,286.99 [Respondents1, Default Indemnity Fund
and Industrial Commission of Utah, Brief, Appendix 3 ] . This was
the standard that allowed Appellant and her husband to live in
the style and condition suitable to their station in life as
referred to in the Utah cases of Hancock and Farnsworth, supra.
5

Being solely obligated to pay the mortgage and other debts was
the reality which claimant had to face upon the death of her
husband.

In reference to Mrs. Dahl's returning to the home after

the death of her husband, Respondent's, Default Indemnity Fund,
Brief states:

"This self imposed and created burden should not

obliterate the intent and meaning of fa most beneficent law1"
[Respondent's Brief, P. 15]. Can it be said that a threatened
mortgage foreclosure, deficiency judgment and possible bankruptcy
are "self imposed?"

This "most beneficent law" should and must

take into account the realty of the parties1 intertwined obligations which were incurred during the course of the marriage and
were present at the time of Mr. Dahl's death and upon which
claimant was jointly liable.

It should make due allowance for

that loss when one of the joint obligors ceases to make his
agreed monthly contribution to the joint debts and obligations of
the parties.

Contrary to Respondents' contentions, this form of

dependency is real and not imaginary.
The Administrative Law Judge did not want to hear about the
financial difficulties Mrs. Dahl was having as a result of her
husband's failure to pay the mortgage payments.

He sustained

counsel Pixton's objections to that evidence who stated, as part
of her objection:

"Her [Mrs. Dahl's] expenses today I think are

totally irrelevant to her dependency on August 1" [R-52].

His

view of the overall case was simply erroneous and did not follow
established Utah law.

6

CONCLUSION

The Administrative Law Judge, applied a narrow view of
dependency and erroneously disregarded the Utah law as set forth
in the cases of Hancock and Farnsworth, supra.

The Industrial

Commission, affirming that decision, was also reversible error,
and the decision of the Industrial Commission should be reversed
and Appellant be awarded the $30,000.00 death benefit to which
she is entitled as the spouse of the decedent under the Workmanfs
Compensation statutes.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

J

day of March, 1987.

GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS

IK J. GUSTIN
J
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
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